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Introduction
As Social Security faces financial difficulties, few would argue that the
program is not in need of change.' However, there is much less consensus
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
LLM. 1992, Georgetown University Law Center; JD. 1987, George Washington University
National Law Center, B.S. 1981, Howard University. I wish to thank Daniel L Halperin and
Kathryn L. Moore for their comments on earlier drafts and to Lindsey Aitken and Alexus Sham
for their very valuable research assistance.
1. Public discomfort about the Social Security program stems from concern that the
system is no longer sustainable. There is fear that unless payroll taxes are raised, future bene-
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about the manner and degree of change required.2 Most proposals that have
emerged in the Social Security reform debate involve three basic concepts:
pre-funding, investment diversification, and privatization.3 Although these
concepts are frequently considered interdependent, they are actually separate
and distinct. Pre-funding refers to the requirement that there be sufficient
assets accumulated in the trust fund in advance to pay for future retirement
costs.' Diversification describes an investment strategy that allocates Social
Security reserve funds among different investment alternatives.' Privatization
ficiaries will be forced to accept reduced benefits, relative to the current benefit package. See
Investing Social Security Reserves in Private Securities, HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Soc.
Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 21-27 (1999) (statement of
Robert D. Reischauer) [hereinafter Investing Social Security Reserves] ("Because neither the
public nor lawmakers have greeted the prospect of higher taxes or reduced spending with any
enthusiasm, the option of boosting the returns on Social Security's reserves is worth close
examination.").
2. See I U.S.ADviSORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SEC., REPORT OF THE 1994-1996 ADVISORY
COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SEcuprrY (1997) [hereinafter ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT] (describing
three recommendations for rectifying Social Security funding shortfall). The council could not
agree on one solution for the Social Security issue and therefore proposed three separate plans.
Id. at 25-33. One plan maintains benefits through increased taxation, redirecting the Social
Security portion of the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund. Id. at 25. The second proposal creates
individual accounts in which the individuals may choose from a limited list of investment
possibilities, and the central assets of the trust will continue to be invested in treasury bonds.
Id. at 28. The final proposal creates personal securities accounts. Id. at 30. This plan consists
of two tiers of individual accounts; the first tier employs a flat dollar retirement benefit covering
all workers, and the second tier consists of fully funded individual retirement accounts. Id.
Also, immediately before this Article went to press, the President's Commission to
Strengthen Social Security released a report on December 21, 2001, detailing three proposals
for reforming Social Security. All three proposals recommend voluntary, individually con-
trolled personal retirement accounts. Although the voluntary characteristic of the proposals
adds complexity regarding implementation and administration, the voluntary characteristic does
not impact the substantive issues surrounding Social Security privatization. However, full
consideration of the report is not possible at this time. The President's Commission to Strength-
en Social Security, Strengthen ing Social Security and Creating Personal Wealth for AllAmeri-
cans (Dec. 21, 2001), available at http'i/csss.gov/reportsFinalreportpdf
3. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 2, at 25-33; see also David Altig & Jaga-
deesh Gokhale, Social Security Privatization: One Proposal, CATO PROJECT ON Soc. SEc.
PRIVATIZATION, No. 9, May 29, 1997, at 8-12 (proposing system of individually owned private
accounts for specific generation of retirees, much like 401 (k) plans offered today).
4. Kevin Lansing, Can the StockMarket Save Social Security?, FRBSF ECON. LErR,
Dec. 11, 1998, at 3 (noting assets in program could be held in individual accounts or Social
Security trust fund).
5. Mary C. Daly, Understanding the Social Security Debate, FRBSF ECON. LEIER,
June 25, 1999, at 3 ("The idea behind diversification is to take advantage of the historical return
advantage of common stocks over other financial assets."); Lansing, supra note 4, at 3 (discuss-
ing whether investment in stock market can provide solution to probable future of social secu-
rity deficits).
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pertains to the creation of individual accounts owned and managed by work-
ers, very much like the accounts of 401 (k) defined contribution plans.6 Priva-
tization proposals generally are based on either a "carve out" or "add on" ap-
proach.' The add on approach funds the individual accounts with new Social
Security contributions, whereas the carve out approach diverts portions of
current contributions to fund the individual accounts.8
Pre-funding and diversification could be implemented under the existing
structure of Social Security; however, privatization radically changes boththe
structure and character of the existing program. Furthermore, the carve out
model of privatization presents a questionable trade-off.9 On the one hand,
workers will have greater investment freedom in a privatized system; on the
other, they will be exposed to significantly greater risks. Thus, Social Secu-
rity privatization has potentially serious implications for retirement income
security to the extent that it relies on current contributions. ° For this reason,
privatization is the focus of much of the Social Security reform debate and is
the subject of this Article.
6. See Daly, supra note 5, at 3 (describing privatization plans); Lansing, supra note 4,
at 3 (same). The meaning of the term "privatization" can vary significantly, however, it most
frequently refers to the use of individual accounts. Alicia H. Munnel, Reforming SocialSecu-
rity: The Case AgainstIndividualAccounts, 52 NAT'L TAxJ. 803, 806-07 (1999) (describing
"privatization").
7. Proposals to privatize in both categories range from partial to full replacement of the
current Social Security benefit structure. Kathyn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security:
MisguidedReform, 71 TEP. L. REV. 131,148-49 (1998).
8. See Jacob M. Schlesinger, Bush Plan to Privatize Social Security Will Face Host of
Hurdles, WAL ST. J. EUR., Dec. 18, 2000, at A24 (describing "add on" proposal); see also
AARP RESEARCHGROUP, DIVIDIuALACCOUNTS, SOCAL SECURrrY, AND THE 2000 ELECTION
15 (Sept 2000) (detailing carve out approach).
9. See Kathryn L. Moore, PartialPrivatization ofSocial Security: Assessing Its Effects
on Women, Minorities, andLower-Income Workers, 65 Mo. L. REV. 341,366 (2000) (conclud-
ing that differential returns for participants in privatized social security system would meet
program's progressive goals).
10. The fact that over 66% of the current retiree population opposes privatization is very
informative. Their opposition presumably demonstrates that they value the guaranteed benefits
that the present Social Security program provides and that they prefer not to risk them for
privatization. Elizabeth Crowley, SocialSecurityReform: The GreatDivide, WALL ST. J., Mar.
11, 1999, at A14. The concerns of opponents ofprivatization are validated by the compositions
of the various groups that withhold support for such proposals. Id, Privatization is unpopular
among low-income individuals: less than 33% of individuals who earn less than $20,000 a year
support proposals to privatize. Id. In contrast, more than 50% of those who earn more than
$50,000 a year support these proposals. Id. Additionally, only one-third of non-college gradu-
ates support such proposals, as compared to one-half of the professional population. Id. But
see Daniel Shapiro, The Moral Casefor Social Security Privatization, CATO PROJECT ON Soc.
SEC. PRIVATIZATION, Oct 29, 1998 (providing one example of privatizatlion reform proposed
by CATO Institute).
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Specifically, this Article analyzes the impact of privatization on the
existing Social Securityprogram. Part I describes the structure and status ofthe
current Social Security program Part II describes the principal elements of
Social Security reform proposals. Part Il critiques the private retirement
system and its reliance on individual accounts as primary retirement savings
vehicles, and demonstrates whythis model is inappropriate as a replacement for
the existing Social Security program. Part IV explores the impact ofprivatiza-
tion on the public welfare function of Social Security and examines some ofthe
weaknesses in many ofthe privatization proposals. The Article concludes that
privatization is a questionable solution for the Social Security debate. There-
fore, as policymakers take steps toward implementing a privatized system, they
should be mindful of the primary objectives of the existing Social Security
program and the relationship ofthese goals to present societal conditions.
I. The Social Security Program
Social Securityis one ofthe most popular and successful social programs
in this country's history." In addition to retirement benefits, Social Security
provides disability and life insurance protection. 2 The program enjoys a wide
base of political support, largely because it provides benefits to all covered
workers and their families, regardless of income. Currently, over 90% of the
labor force contributes to the Social Security program, and 48 million families
receive benefit payments from the program. 3 Although Congress never in-
11. The Social Security program began as a political response to the economic trauma of
the Great Depression. William 0. Shipman, Retiring with Dignity: Social Security Versus
Private Markets, WASH. Q., Jan. 1,1999, at 119. During this period, real gross national product
shrunk by more than 25% and unemployment rose by 22%. I. During this same period, the
stock market dropped by 70%. Id. Witnessing the despair of the country, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt promised legislation that would restore economic security to the nation in his June
8, 1934 address to Congress. Ia One year later, on August 14, 1935, Congress passed the
Social Security Act. Id.
12. DWM B. PAPADIMrRIOU & L. RANDALL WRAY, DOES SOCIAL SECURITY NEED
SAVING?: PROVIDNG FOR RETIREES THROUGHOUT THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 8-9 (1999
Jerome Levy Econ. Inst of Bard Coll., Pub. Pol'y Brief No. 55). Social Security consists of
several different programs: Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), the hospital insurance
portion of Medicare (HI), Supplemental Medical Insurance (SM), and Disability Insurance (Dl).
Id. OASI and DI are oflen combined because the financial operations of each program are
managed by the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability
Insurance Trust Fund, both established at the Treasury. Id.; see also Catherine il Privatizing
Social Securi y Is Bad, Particularlfor Women, DOILARs & SENSE, Nov. 1, 2000, at 18 (noting
that regardless of age, when workers become too disabled to work, they are eligible to receive
benefits).
13. See H-ill, supra note 12, at 17 (noting Social Security statistics). The average monthly
payment for a retired worker is $825. Id. The maximum monthly benefit is $1,373 for workers
who consistently earned wages equal to or in excess of the wage cap over thirty-five years. Id.
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tended Social Security to be a primary source of income, today a majority of
retired households depend on Social Security for more than one-half of their
total income.
14
A mandatory, flat-rate payroll tax funds Social Security benefits. Cur-
rently, the tax rate is 12.4% and applies to all cash earnings up to $80,400.15
Employers and employees pay the tax evenly, self-employed individuals pay
the full tax themselves.
16
The Social Security program has been very effective in reducing poverty
within the senior population in this country. When Congress established
Social Security in 1934, approximately 50% of the elderly population lived in
poverty. 7 Twenty-five years later, although the poverty rate among the
elderly fell to 35%, it nevertheless remained higher than that of other groups."8
However, after Social Security benefits increased in the 1960s and 1970s, the
poverty rate within the senior population dropped precipitously. 9 Presently,
the poverty rate for senior citizens is below that of children and working-age
adults, with only 11% of the elderly having incomes below the poverty level.20
The Social Security Trustees publish an annual actuarial report that
assesses the financial status of the Social Security program.2' A seventy-five
For this purpose senior households are defined as households with at least one member aged
sixty-five or above.
14. Id. at 17; see also Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement Retirement In-
come and the Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 LOY. LAL L.
REV. 1063, 1120 (1997) (stating that "program was never designed to be the sole or major
support for retired workers... [B]enefits were designed to replace on average only about 45%
of the pre-retirement earnings of a worker."); infra Part MI.B (describing risk of shortfall in
defined contribution plans).
15. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101(a), 311 1(a) (1994) (payroll tax); 42 U.S.C. § 430 (1994) (earnings
cap). Cash earnings in excess of $80,400 are subject to a 2.9% payroll tax for Medicare, which
also is paid evenly by the employer and the employee. 26 U.S.C. § 3101(bX6) (1994).
16. See26U.S.C.§§1401,1402(a)(1994);seealsoARYBURTLESs&BARRYBoswoRTH,
PRIVATIZnGSOCIALSECURITY: THE TROUBuNG TRADE-OFFs (Brookings Inst Pol'y BriefNo.
14, Mar. 1997), available athttp://www.brook.edulcommpolcybriefs/pbO14Ipbl4.htm
17. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Making Social Securiy Workfor Women and Men, 16
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 359,366-67 (1999).
18. Daly, supra note 5, at 3.
19. Id.
20. See Forman, supra note 17, at 367 (noting poverty rate among various age brackets).
According to the United States Census Bureau, the estimated poverty threshold for the year
2000 for a household of two, sixty-five years and over is $10,414. U.S. Census Bureau, Pre-
liminary Estimate of Weighted Average Poverty Thresholds for 2000, Jan. 26, 2001, available
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshold/00prelimhtml.
21. Using stated economic, interest rate, and demographic assumptions, these reports
determine the relationship of tax revenue to benefit pay-outs. The forecasts are made by the
Trustees of Social Security and Medicare, the Social Security Commissioner, along with two
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year projection period is used to determine the long-run relationship of tax
revenue to benefit pay-outs. Recent reports predict a long-run deficit equal
to 1.86% of payroll earnings.' This figure suggests that in order to have
sufficient funds to pay the current package of Social Security benefits over the
next seventy-five years, Congress must increase payroll taxes immediately by
1.86%.23
If, however, Congress makes no adjustments to the program, by 2016, tax
revenue will no longer exceed benefit pay-outs, necessitating the use of the
trust fund reserve to pay for benefits. 24 The trust fund reserve could pay full
benefits through 2038, but it would then be depleted.' Depletion of the trust
fund would mean that a portion of the benefit package that exists today could
not be paid in the future. Specifically, there would be a 27% shortfall in the
funding of current benefits if Congress makes no changes to benefits and
maintains the current rate of payroll taxes.26 It is this projected 27% gap that
has sparked public uneasiness about the future of Social Security, as well as
much of the Social Security reform debateY
additional members who are externalto the program. THE2001 ANNUALREPORTOFTHBEBOARD
OF TRUSTEES OF nTE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND DISABH=rYINSUR-
ANCE TRUST FUNDS, available at ftp'/fflp.ssagov/putloact(trOI.pdf [hereinafter 2001 OASDI
REPORT]; Edward M. Granlich, MendingBut Not EndingSocial Security: The IndividualAc-
countsPlan, in FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis REV. 3,7 (1998).
22. This figure is down by.03 from last year's report See 2001 OASDI REPORT, supra
note2l; see also THE2000ANNUALREPORT OF THEBOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THEFEDERALOID-
AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND DISABmIi INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, available at
ftp'//ftp.ssa.gov/putoa/trOO.pdf
23. See Munnell, supra note 6, at 804 (explaining Social Security's long-term deficit);
see also 2001 OASDI REPORT, supra note 21 (describing options for overcoming shortfall).
The Trustee report also includes a ten-year projection. Id.
24. This projection uses intermediate actuarial assumptions. 2001 OASDI REPORT, supra
note 21. Interest on the contributions has been added. ADVISORY COUNCILREPORT, supra note
2, at 11; Munnell, supra note 6, at 804. The trust fund reserve holds the surplus funds when
payroll taxes exceed current benefit costs for a given year. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra
note 2, at 11.
25. This statement assumes that benefits remain the same. 2001 OASDI REPORT, supra
note 21.
26. See Munnell, supra note 6, at 807 (noting shortfall).
27. The Social Security program has experienced financial difficulty before. In 1975,
payroll tax revenue fell short of benefit pay-outs. The shortfall was covered by using a portion
of the reserve. Gramlich, supra note 21, at 3. The urgency of the matter heightened when the
Old-Age and Survivor Insurance (OASI) portion of the Social Security program borrowed
money from the Disability and Medicare portions of the program in order to pay for its monthly
expenses in 1982. Id. Accordingly, Congress passed legislation in 1983 that was expected to
resolve the financial problems of the Social Security program over both the long- and short-run.
Id. The 1983 legislation used several different tactics to restore financial soundness to the
program. It increased taxes, taxed the Social Security benefits of high income beneficiaries,
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Although the projected 27% shortfall is useful in defining the extent of
the funding deficiency, and therefore policynakers should seriously consider
it, the seventy-five year forecast is only a prediction. It is impossible for
actuaries to take into account all of the social developments that could affect
the payment of payroll taxes and benefits, such as wars, depressions, and
recessions." Unexpected changes in demographic conditions also could con-
tribute to the possibility of a deviation from the projection. 9 Thus, the 27%
gap may or may not accurately predict the actual experience of the Social
Security program over the next seventy-five years.3
I. Elements of Social Security Reform Proposals
One source of confusion regarding Social Security reform proposals is
the presence of three related, but different, concepts: pre-funding, diversifica-
tion, and privatization. It is important to define and distinguish these three
concepts in order to better understand their relationships to each other, as well
as to appreciate fully their potential impact on the existing Social Security
program. Some commentators have linked privatization with the concepts of
advanced funding and diversification. However, these terms are neither
synonymous nor dependent. Privatization in this context means only separate
accounts and self-direction.31 In contrast, pre-funding refers to the accumula-
postponed a cost-of-living benefit adjustment, and broadened the Social Security tax base by
extending participation to newly hired federal government employees. IM Although the legis-
lation succeeded at producing large surpluses and improving the short-term financial outlook
of the program, in less than ten years, the long-term outlook of the program was again called
into question. Id. Consequently, in 1994, Congress appointed an Advisory Council to deter-
mine the status of the Social Security program, and in 2000, the President's Commission was
formed to strengthen Social Security. Id. The Advisory Council and the Commission, along
with many economists, social scientists, and other policymakers, have proposed numerous plans
aimed at restoring the Social Security program to financial health. Id.; see supra text accompa-
nying note 3 (describing proposed means of reforming Social Security).
28. These events can impact both the labor force and overall production. Benefits in pay-
ment status typically increase relative to the Consumer Price Index, while tax revenue increases
relative to wage growth. Munnell, supra note 6, at 804.
29. Birth and death rates impact the projected shortfall because they determine the pay-
ment of payroll taxes and benefits. Phillip O'Connor, Predicting System's Future IsRiskyBusi-
ness: SomeProjectionsArefor 75 Yearsfrom Now, ST. Louis POST-DSPATCH, Oct 15,2000,
atA10.
30. A greater degree of accuracy could be achieved over a shorter period of time. See
generally Kenn B. Tacchino & Cynthia Sallzman, Should Social Security Be Included When
Projecting RetirementIncome?, J. FIN. PLANNING, Mar. 1, 2001 (discussing projected Social
Security shortfall).
31. Lansing, supra note 4, at 3. Self-direction allows individual workers to make their
own investment selections among a range of stocks and bond investment alternatives. See also
supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing privatization as meaning creation of individual
accounts).
58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1287 (2001)
tion of sufficient funds in advance to pay for promised benefits; diversifica-
tion refers to the ability to invest the Social Security reserve funds in more
productive private markets.'2 Without privatizing, Congress could signifi-
cantly reduce the anticipated shortfall in the Social Security program by
adopting an advanced funding method in conjunction with more aggressive
investment policies.
33
A. Social Security Funding
Four years after it established the Social Security program, Congress
voted to operate the program on a pay-as-you-go basis. This was due to Con-
gress's concern that the government would be unable to manage a large trust
fund responsibly.34 Under a pay-as-you-go funding arrangement, instead of
holding the contributions of current workers to later pay for their future bene-
fits, the system immediately uses the contributions of current workers to
finance the benefits of current retirees.35 Thus, under this type of funding
scheme, the goal is not to collect amounts in excess of those needed to cover
current expenses. There may be de minimis surpluses from time to time, but
the program never intentionally creates significant funding reserves. In the
event that the payroll taxes collected in a given year exceed the amount
necessary to pay for current benefits, the Social Security Administration holds
the surplus in the Social Security trust fund. 6
When Congress established the Social Security program, the ratio of
current workers to beneficiaries made the pay-as-you-go funding arrangement
more feasible than it is today. An initially smaller pool of Social Security
beneficiaries was followed by increasingly larger ones.37 This relationship
allowed the cost ofthe first group's benefits to be spread across a larger popu-
32. The Perils of Privatization, WASaa Q., Jan. 1, 1999, at 10; see also supra notes 4-5
and accompanying text (discussing pre-funding and diversification).
33. See ADVISORY COuNCILREPORT, supra note 2, at 25. UndertheAdvisory Council's
proposal for maintenance of benefits, 40% of the Social Security fund would be invested in the
private equities, while it is estimated that the rate of return between treasury bonds and the
private market differs by approximately 4.7% per year. Id.
34. See Investing Social Security Reserves, supra note 1, at 24-25; Lansing, supra note
4, at 3.
35. In contrast a pre-funded program has sufficient assets to cover the accrued liabilities,
and workers would generally receive benefits that equal the actuarial equivalent of their payroll
tax contributions. Lansing, supra note 4, at 3. For a more detailed discussion on the two fund-
ing methods, see CARoLYN L. WEAVER, THE CRisis mN SocAL SECURny 119-23 (1982).
36. See BuRTiEss & BoswoRTB, supra note 16 (describing use of surplus funds).
37. Donald B. Marron, Not Privatizing Social Security Is the Biggest Risk ofAll, WALL
ST. 3., May 18, 2000, at A26 (stating ratio of workers per beneficiary in 1935 was twenty-five
to one).
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lation of workers. However, the combination of program expansions and
demographic changes has caused a sharp decline in the current worker-to-
beneficiary ratio, making pay-as-you-go funding an impractical arrangement3
8
Program expansions have awarded larger benefits to groups who have contrib-
uted relatively small amounts.39  Consequently, these expansions have in-
creased the costs that subsequent generations incur for the benefits of prior
ones.
Another factor contributing to the decline of the worker-to-beneficiary
ratio is the aging of the baby-boom generation." The baby-boom cohort will
be the largest group of retirees covered by the Social Security program since
its inception. This group represents a 54% increase in the retired population,
taken as a percentage of the total population.41 The number ofbaby-boomers
alone is sufficient to present financial difficulty for the Social Security pro-
gram; however, the fact that a relatively small generation of workers followed
the baby-boom generation exacerbates the situation. Presently, there are only
3.3 current workers per beneficiary.' Official predictions indicate that this
ratio will drop to two workers per beneficiary by 2030, unless demographic
and behavioral factors change unexpectedly.43
38. See Daly, supra note 5 (noting that program expansions and behavioral changes have
reduced current ratio to 3.3 workers per Social Security beneficiary).
39. See Dorothy A. Brown t al., Social Security Reform: Risks, Returns, and Race, 9
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 633, 635-36 (2000) (noting tension that exists between goals of
"social adequacy" and "individual equity").
40. The baby boomer population was born between 1946 and 1964. Patricia E. Dilley,
Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social Security Privatization, 41
B.C. L. REV. 975, 987 (2000). Other demographic factors impacting the beneficiary-to-worker
ratio were the increases in the number of early retirements, as well as the increases in life expec-
tancies. In 1950, fifteen years after the establishment of Social Security, the average retirement
age for males was fifty-nine, and the life expectancy of males who reached age sixty-five was
approximately age sixty-eight. Consequently, at that time, the average male could expect to live
only nine years after retirement In contrast, currently a male aged sixty-five can expect to reach
eighty-one years of age, and the average retirement age is sixty-four. Thus, currently, the aver-
age male can expect to live approximately seventeen years after retirement See Lansing, supra
note 4, at 1 (describing aging of baby-boom generation).
41. See Daly, supra note 5 (describing demographics of Social Security).
42. Id. (noting that smaller generation is frequently referred to as "baby bust" generation).
43. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RESTORING LONG-TERM SOLVENCY WH.LREQUIRE
DIFICULT CHoICES 2 (1998). However, it is unlikely that the ratio of workers to beneficiaries
will ever increase at accelerating rates again, as it did immediately after the establishment of the
Social Security program. Instead, it can be expected that the working population will fluctuate
relative to social and economic forces. Demographers explain that uninterrupted growth trends
are unlikely because population size is inversely related to the size of previous generations. Id.
Richard Easterlin explains in his book Birth and Fortune that it is predictable that large birth
cohorts follow small ones, and that small cohorts follow large ones. See generally RICHARD
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To address this situation, Congress passed legislation in 1977 that moved
the Social Securityprogram away from a purely pay-as-you-go funding method
toward a "partial reserve funding" method." This legislation was designed to
create a substantial Social Security funding reserve; however, because of a
sudden down-trm inthe economy, the reserve did not materialize as expected. 45
Therefore, Congress passed additional legislation in 1983 that simultaneously
raised payrolltaxes and instituted a series ofbenefit cuts. 46 These changes have
led to a steady growth of the Social Security reserve fund.47 The reserve fund
reached $763 billion in 1998, which represented almost twice the amount of
annual benefits payable at that time, and at the end of 2000, the reserve fund
had reached $1,049 billion.' However, assuming predictions regarding key
variables such as imunigration, inflation, and labor force participation are cor-
rect, unless Congress makes immediate changes tothe program, the surplus will
beginto erode when the first ofthe baby-boomers begin to retire.49
B. Diversification
Since the creation of the Social Security program in 1935, the law has
required that reserve funds be invested exclusively in securities guaranteed by
EASTEaLIN, Bum AND FORTUNE (1980) (describing birth trends). He explains that the un-
expectedly high living standards cause small generations to produce larger families. Id. The
larger generation in turn will experience disappointment in its living standards, and conse-
quently will be more reluctant to have large families; thus, population growth does not increase
or decrease consistently from one generation to the next, but rather skips generations. Id.
44. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 2, at 16; see also Investing SocialSecurity
Reserves, supra note 1, at 23.
45. InvestingSocial SecurityReserves, supra note 1, at23.
46. This legislation was initiated by the Presidential Committee appointed by President
Ronald Reagan in 1981, headed by Alan Greenspan. WALTER ht CADETIE, SOCIAL SECURrTY
PRiVATIZATION: A BAD IDEA 3 (1999 Jerome Levy Econ. Inst of Bard Coil. Pol'y Note No.
10).
47. In 1998, payroll taxes were $440 billion, and benefits and fees equaled $382 billion.
Daly, supra note 5.
48. At that time, the interest earned on the existing trust fund was equal to $49 billion.
See id.; Investing Social Security Reserves, supra note 1, at 23; see also Daly, supra note 5
(noting that overall annual surplus for 1998 was therefore $107 billion). Under current policies
and assumptions, the surplus is expected to close at more than $2.5 trillion in 2010, which is
three times more than the projected annual benefits for that period. 2001 OASDI REPORT, supra
note 21; Daly, supra note 5.
49. See 2001 OASDI REPORT, supra note 21; supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text
(discussing factors contributing to expected erosion of surplus). The first of the baby boomers
will begin to retire in 2011 when they reach age sixty-five; the youngest of the boomer genera-
tion will reach age sixty-five in 2029. However, those electing the earlier retirement age of
sixty-two will begin to retire in 2008. See CADETrE, supra note 46, at 3 (explaining Social
Security and expected shortfall).
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the federal government."0 This restriction can be explained historically. When
Congress established the Social Security program in 1935, the United States
had just undergone the stock market crash of 1930. Default on the payment of
corporate bonds was also widespread." Accordingly, at that time, the public
perceived government securities as the safest and most appropriate form of
investment for Social Security trust funds.52
As a result ofthese investment restrictions, most ofthe trust fund reserve
is still invested in special, non-marketable, low-risk Treasury securities.53
Unlike publicly held notes and bonds, whose market values can fluctuate
over time, these government securities can be sold back to the Treasury at
par value, at any time.54 Thus, the restrictions on the investment of the trust
fund assets protect them from the volatility of the private market; however,
they also cause the funds to experience relatively low rates of investment
return.
55
When the Social Security program operated purely on a pay-as-you-go
funding basis, the annual surpluses were small and sporadic. Thus, the lower
rate of return on the investment yield of the trust fund reserve had little or no
practical effect on the financial status of the program. However, when Con-
gress passed legislation in 1983 that allowed partial reserve financing, the
loss of income to the program resulting from investment in low-risk, low-
yield instruments has become increasingly significant as the surplus has in-
creased.
56
50. Both the principle and the interest must be invested in this manner. Altig & Gokhale,
supra note 3, at 6.
51. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (noting concern about government's ability
to manage large sums).
52. Investing Social Securit, Reserves, supra note 1, at 23.
53. See id. (explaining investment of trust fund reserve).
54. "Par value" is the nominal or face value ofthe stock. BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARYl145
(7th ed. 1999).
55. See Investing SocialSecurity Reserves, supra note 1, at 23 (explaining return on trust
fund).
56. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (describing shift to partial reserve
financing); see also Investing SocialSecurity Reserves, supra note 1, at 23-24. The restrictions
placed on the investment of the Social Security reserve also have added additional complexity
to the debate over Social Security reform. There is considerable confusion among commenta-
tors regarding the impact of more aggressive investment of the Social Security reserve. Support-
ers of certain reform proposals contend that their plans are better than others because they
provide increased returns on Social Security contributions. However, most proposals provide
greater returns simply because they do not restrict investment to low-risk, low-yield Treasury
securities. Investing Social Securit, Reserves, supra note 1, at 23-24. Theoretically, if the
reserve funds were invested in the private market, the Social Security Trust fund should earn
the same average rate of investment return as individual private retirement accounts. In fact,
because of economies of scale, the net investment return of a single public fund actually should
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The average annual real rate of return inthe private market was 9.4% from
1926 to 1996.Y During the same period, the corresponding rate of return on
intermediate government bonds was 2.3%. By comparison, the real rate of
return received on the Social Security surplus is estimated at 1.3%.58 The
aggregate rate of return on Social Security contributions is significantly lower
than the rate ofreturn for government bonds because the switch to pay-as-you-
go flmding in 1939 produced a huge windfall for the initial generation of Social
Security retirees. 9 These recipients collected full Social Security benefits,
even though they made only nominal contributions to the program; thus, the
program acquired an unfumded liability of $9 trillion.' As a result this re-
quires every subsequent generation to pay both a portion of the unfunded
liability, and the implicit interest costs for the benefits paid to the first genera-
tion of Social Security retirees.6' An estimated 3% of current payroll taxes is
devoted to this expense.6' Consequently, one-fourth of Social Security contri-
butions receive no positive earnings, while the remaining three-fourths earn the
market rate for bonds of 2.3%.63 This allocation produces a net rate of return
on aggregate payroll tax contributions of 1.3%.' Therefore, although the trust
fund reserve earns the market rate of return for government bonds, due to the
large unfunded liability, the real rate of return on the Social Security surplus
is much lower thanthe prevailing rate on government bonds.65 For this reason,
unless measures are takento pay off the unfunded liability, investing the Social
Security payroll tax contributions in more productive private markets may not
result in high returns on aggregate contributions. 6
be higher than the returns on individual investment accounts. BURTL.sS & BosWORTH, supra
note 16.
57. See Munnell, supra note 6, at 807 (noting rate of return).
58. Id.
59. See Dilley, supra note 14, at 1136 (noting differential rates of return).
60. Ms. Ida Fuller, the first person to receive monthly benefits from the Social Security
program, paid only $22 in Social Security taxes, but nevertheless collected over $20,000 in
benefits during her lifetime. Lansing, supra note 4, at 1.
61. See Munnell, supra note 6, at 807 (discussing projected low returns on Social Security
under pay-as-you-go system).
62. See id. (explaining that early generations received transfers of approximately $9
trillion and later generations must pay bill).
63. IM; see supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (describing payroll tax).
64. See Munnell, supra note 6, at 807 (explaining that higher gains by privatization are
offset by increased taxes in order to pay for interest on bonds).
65. Id.; see infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text (discussing effects of liabilities on
switch from pay-as-you-go funding to pro-funded individual account system).
66. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text (discussing risks inherent in investing
funds in private markets).
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The aggregate rate of return on Social Security contributions should not
be confused with the rate of return earned by individual workers on their
payroll tax contributions. The individual rate of return earned by workers on
their Social Security contributions is not a fixed number, but varies relative
to a worker's year of birth and marital status.67 Thus, for example, there is
great disparity between the rate of return for average-wage workers bom
before and after 1930.' Workers born in the 1920s receive a significantly
higher return of almost 6% on their Social Security contributions because they
paid a payroll tax of only 2% throughout much of their early careers.69 The
2% rate was sufficient because there were relatively few retirees eligible for
full retirement benefits during this time.70 For later cohorts, however, the
individual rate of return on Social Security contributions reaches projections
as low as 1.7%.7 Thus, notwithstanding a higher rate of return on the contri-
butions, an increase in current payroll taxes or a reduction in the current
benefit package would cause the individual rates of return to further decline.7 2
C. Privatization
Some form of privatization is an integral part of many of the best-known
Social Security restructuring proposals. 3 Essentially, there are two different
ways of implementing privatization. One approach is to carve the individual
accounts out of existing funds. This arrangement is referred to as the "carve
out" approach. 4 Such an arrangement would reduce the current benefit
67. See BuRTiEss & BoswoRTH, supra note 16 (citing higher returns as argument for
privatization). More recently, because the tax rate has increased and provides more generous
benefits for a larger number ofretirees, the rate of return has continued to decline. Id.
68. Id.
69. Workers born in the 1920s also benefitted from rapid wage growth throughout their
careers. Id.
70. Id.
71. The 1.7% rate ofretum applies to average wage earners born in 2004. Id. However,
this rate does not reflect the additional protection for disability and death, nor does it reflect the
indirect benefits of the Social Security program, such as not having to support parents. See
generally Gary Burtless, How Would FinancialRiskAffectRetirement In come UnderIndividual
Accounts?, in CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RES. AT BOSTON C. POL'Y BRIEF No. 6 (Oct 2000)
(discussing rate of return).
72. See infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text (discussing unrealistic expectations
of proponents of privatization regarding rates of return of funds invested in private markets).
73. See, e.g., ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 2 (summarizing different plans
discussed by 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security).
74. See Colleen T. CangelSocial Security: PrivateAccounts Would Help Women, Sena-
tors Say; PanelDivided, 26 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 614,614 (1999) (noting strong support
of Senator John Breaux (D-La.) for carve out approach).
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package." Thus, workers would be better off than they are under the current
system only if their individual accounts performed well enough to make up the
difference. 6 If the accounts did not perform well, however, workers could
receive substantially less than the benefits they are provided under the current
system.7 The second approach to establishing an individual account program
is to add the accounts on top of current benefits.78 This approach is referred
to as the "add on" approach? 9 Using this method, new money from the pro-
jected budget surplus would fund the additional accounts." Accordingly, this
could guarantee workers the receipt of benefits at least equal to the ones they
would receive under the current system. The add on approach is the more
popular approach among workers.
81
The presence of these two alternatives adds complexity and confusion to
the Social Security privatization debate. Surveys indicate that when the carve
out approach is discussed rather than the add on approach, support for privat-
ization drastically declines."m A poll taken by the American Association of
Retired People (AARP), an influential senior lobby group, showed that more
than 50% of those who support private accounts oppose them when it is clear
that the carve out approach would reduce benefits provided under the existing
program.83 Also, support for the add on approach drops sharply when these
proposals are made in connection with increased taxes. 4 Thus, much of the
enthusiasm about privatization often stems from distortions about its meaning,
as well as its true cost.
75. Schlesinger, supra note 8, atA24.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Cangel, supra note 74, at 614 (describing both carve out and add on approaches
as possible solutions for Social Security shortfall).
79. Id.
80. Schlesinger, supra note 8, at A24.
81. Seventy percent of individuals polled supported the add on approach, while only 54%
supported the carve out method. AARP RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 8, at 16,24.
82. Id. at 15 (explaining that specifics of privatization proposals determines level of
support that they receive).
83. IM at 16-17. Support for the carve out approach sharply declined when such propos-
als included the reduction of guaranteed benefits or the creation of a new government agency.
Id. at 17-18. Support for the carve out approach dropped to 42% and 38% respectively with the
introduction of these mitigating factors. Id.
84. Id. at 25-26. Before the introduction of mitigating factors, 70% of respondents sup-
ported the add on approach. Id. at 24. When asked whether they would continue to support the
add on approach if income taxes were increased in order to pay for government matching funds,
only 25% still supported the approach. Id.
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Most privatization proposals, regardless of form, give workers discretion
to invest some portion of their individual accounts in the manner in which
they choose.85 Although these proposals can impose various restrictions on
the level of risk to which the accounts would be exposed, they nevertheless
allow workers to have some degree of flexibility. 6 Accordingly, the proposed
accounts closely resemble those established in connection with participant-
directed 401(k) plans." Proponents of privatization believe that if workers
have the freedom to invest all or a portion of their individual accounts in more
productive private markets, they will receive higher returns on their contribu-
tions.s Proponents also believe that this will help resolve the Social Security
program's financial problems.8 9
85. See, e.g.,ADVISORYCOUNcaLREPORTsupra note 2, at28-33 (noting that options two
and three recommended by Advisory Council included individual accounts for private invest-
ing); David C. John, Bear Markets Do Not Hurt the Case for Social Security Retirement
Accounts, HEIrrAGE FOUND. EXECuriVE MEMORANDUM,NO. 742, May 1, 2001, at I (defend-
ing use of private retirement accounts in light of recent activity in stock market).
86. See NAT'L AcADEMY OF Soc. INS., EVALUATING ISSUES IN PRIVATIZING SOCIAL
SECURITY: REPORT, WASHINGTON, D.C., 1998, at 46 (explaining that investment options could
vary widely in individual account in privatized system); Nma Mojiri-Azad, Social Security
Benefits to Widows: The Ongoing Favoritism of Single-Earner Families and the Impact on
Elderly Women, 17 LAW & INEQ. 537,550 (1999) (discussing oversight by qualified investment
firms with individuals retaining ability to direct investments).
87. In a participant-directed 401(k) plan, the employee elects first to participate in the
retirement plan and, typically, then further elects how to invest the funds. See JOHN 1L LANG-
BEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BEN=rr LAW 50-52 (3d ed. 2000) (discuss-
ing distinctive traits of 401(k) plans); Altig & Ookhale, supra note 3, at 9 (comparing their
privatization proposal to 401(k) plan). However, proposals to privatize Social Security can
often impose greater investment restrictions than those generally found in 401(k) plans. See
Lansing, supra note 4, at 3 (comparing privatization plans to participant-directed 401(k) plans).
88. Proponents are especially assertive in advancing their cause, appearing on talk shows
and publishing newspaper editorials across the nation. For example, the Economic Security
2000 sent representatives to more than 500 radio stations to discuss the topic of privitization
and placed more than 200 op-ed pieces in newspapers throughout the country advocating some
form of privatization. Christopher Georges, Social-Security 'Privatization'EffortMakes Head-
way, WALL ST. I., June 22, 1998, at A24. Notwithstanding the visible efforts of supporters,
however, survey polls suggest that the public is narrowly divided on the topic, with those op-
posed having a slight lead. In a study conducted by the Wall Street Journal and NBC, 44% of
the population was in favor of some form of privatization, while 51% was opposed. Elizabeth
Crowley, SocialSecurityReform: The GreatDiMde, WAIL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1999, atA14. Also,
the CATO Institute and Heritage Foundation have published numerous articles in support of
privatization. See, e.g., Daniel Shapiro, The Moral Case for Social Security Privatization,
CATO INST., Oct 29, 1998, at 1 ("A privatized Social Security system gives individuals more
freedom to run their lives, is fairer, provides more security, and creates less antagonism between
generations, fostering a greater sense of community.").
89. Michael Tanner, "Saving" Social Security Is Not Enough, CATO PROJECT ON Sc.
SEC. PRrVATiZATION, No. 20, May 20,2000, at 7.
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D. Impact of the Elements
The stock and bond markets are more stable and efficient today than they
were sixty-five years ago. Thus, the concerns that caused Congress to place
the existing restrictions on the Social Security trust fund are no longer rele-
vant.' Although higher returns alone would not resolve the long-term fiscal
problems of Social Security, they could make the problem much more man-
ageable.91 A change in the investment strategy for the Social Security reserve
would make the return on Social Security contributions more consistent with
those received in the private market. However, privatization of the program
is not necessary to accomplish this result. The fact that a program is publicly
managed does not prevent it from being financially sound and sustainable. In
fact, the publicly managed retirement programs ofthousands of state and local
governments have successfully employed advanced funding methods.' Fur-
thermore, if diversification were implemented in conjunction with advanced
funding, this would make larger amounts of funds available for investment in
the more productive private markets.'
For numerous reasons, a critical evaluation of the private retirement
system suggests that the individual account model, without guaranteed mini-
mum benefits, is inappropriate for Social Security.94 First, the recent trend in
the private sector of using 401 (k) plans, rather than traditional defined benefit
plans, shifts the risk of accumulating insufficient assets for retirement from the
employer to the employee, exposing the participants to a greater risk of short-
fall.95 Second, the replacement of the existing Social Security model with
individual accounts would disproportionately impact low-income workers
90. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (noting Congressional concern that govern-
ment could not manage large trust fund responsibly).
91. See Adam B. Norlander, Privatization ofSocialSecurity: An Acceptable Risk, 1999
L. REV. MS.U.-D.C.L. 959, 975-76 (discussing low risk of relying on long-term stock market
investment).
92. See Gay Burless & Barry Bosworth, Privatizing Social Security: The Troubling
Trade-offs, WASI. Q., at 205-07 (Winter 1999) (noting that millions of employees of state and
local governments have advance-funded pensions that are publicly managed). Also, advanced
funding could increase national savings, whether the assets were publicly or privately managed.
Id. at 212.
93. See Investing Social SecuriOv Reserves, supra note 1, at 25 (discussing advantages of
diversified investment strategy and higher returns); see also Burtless & Bosworth, supra note
92, at 205-07 (noting that 9.3% projected return is most optimistic rate assumed by Actuary's
report and that intermediate assumption is closer to 7%).
94. Regina T. Jefferson, Comment to Employers and Individuals Must Do More Today
toAllow Retirement Tomorrow, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SEcuRIrY DEBATE 106 (R. Douglas
Arnold et al. eds., 1998).
95. See infra Part HLB (discussing participants' exposure to risk of shortfall in defined
contribution plans).
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because it would expose them to additional risks and substantially reduce or
possible eliminate the redistributive function ofthe Social Security program.96
Finally, although proponents predict an increase in returns adequate enough to
address the projected shortfall, that level of increase is doubtful in light of the
full cost of implementing such a system.
I. Risk and the Private Pension System
A. Structure of the Private Retirement System
Although the private pension and the Social Security systems are separate
and distinct programs, lessons learned from the private retirement system are
relevant to discussions of Social Security reform.' Therefore, a critical
evaluation of the private retirement system's reliance on individual account
plans as primary retirement savings vehicles is particularly useful as proposals
to privatize the Social Security program are contemplated."
There are two primary categories of retirement plans used in the private
sector: defined benefit and defined contribution. The distinguishing character-
istic between the two is risk allocation.99 A defined benefit plan pools the plan
assets into an aggregate trust fund and guarantees a fixed amount to partici-
pants at retirement, regardless of investment performance."°° In a defined
benefit plan, the employer is liable for the payment of the promised benefits,
and therefore, bears the risk of accumulating insufficient assets." To protect
defined benefit plan participants in the event that an employer becomes insol-
vent, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (the PBGC) insures a limited
accrued benefit intheseplans.'" The defined benefit plan structure is currently
96. Although, theoretically, redistribution is maintainable in a privatiz&d program, because
of the structure of an individual account program, it is politically and practically more difficult
to accomplish. See infra notes 176-79 (explaining that inexperienced investors who suffer under
private system would face same problem under Social Security privatization).
97. Alicia I. Munnell, TheEconomics of Private Pensions 7,13-19 (1982), in LANGBEN
& Wou , supra note 87, at 34-36 (noting implication of systems for development of private
plans).
98. See Jefferson, supra note 94, at 106 (discussing private retirement accounts).
99. See Daniel L Halperin, TaxPolicy and Retirement Income: A Rational Modelfor the
21st Century, in SEARCH FOR A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOE POLICY 159, 184 (Jack L.
VanDerhei ed., 1987) (noting that defined contribution plans potentially differ from defined
benefit plans only in risk).
100. See Peter T. Scott,A NationalRetirement Income Policy,44 TAXNOTES 913,919-20
(1989), reprinted in LANGBEIN & WOLC, supra note 87, at 42-43 (summarizing features of
defined-benefit plans).
101. kl
102. The PBGC is required to pay the vested accrued benefits of plan participants up to a
guaranteed amount when a plan terminates with insufficient assets. ERISA limits the "basic
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used by the Social Security program, with the government effectively guaran-
teeing the delivery of the promised benefits.
In contrast to the single trust in a defined benefit plan, a defined contribu-
tion plan assigns each participant an individual account."0 3 At retirement, the
participant receives the entire account balance, including the contributions and
investment earnings. The relative success or failure of the plan depends on
how well the assets in the accounts are invested. Therefore, in a defined con-
tribution plan, it is the participant, rather than the employer, who bears the
investment risk.14 Advocates of Social Security privatization propose this
structure for Social Security. 05
Since the passage of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA), the private sector has seen a discernable movement toward
using defined contribution plans as primary retirement savings vehicles, rather
than traditional defined benefit plans."ca This trend is explainable by numerous
defined contribution plan features and characteristics. Defined contribution
plans are less expensive and administratively simpler for employers to main-
guaranteed benefit" payable by the PBGC to the lesser of average monthly gross income
determined by a participant's highest compensation in any consecutive five-year period, or $750
per month, adjusted by the cost of living. § 26 C.F.R. 4022.22 (1999).
103. ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1999) (defining defined contribution plan as
"pension plan which provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits
based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant's account, and any income...
which may be allocated to such participant's account").
104. See Jay A. Soled & Bruce A. Wolk, The Minimum Distribution Rules and Their
Critical Role in Controlling the Floodgates of Qualified Plan Wealth, 2000 BYU L. REV. 587,
591-93 (2000) (contrasting traditional defined benefit plans with defined contribution plans).
105. See Tanner, supra note 89, at 7.
106. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, better known as ERISA, is a
massive piece of legislation. ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of Title 26 and 29 U.S.C.). It originated in 1962 during the
presidency of John F. Kennedy. President Kennedy commissioned a special cabinet-level task
force to evaluate the impact of private retirement programs on the nation's economy and public
policy, as well as to evaluate the investment policies of these programs and whether they were
sufficient to provide promised benefits to participants. See 120 CONG. REc. S15, 743 (1974)
(statement of Sen. Javits). More than a decade later, President Ford signed ERISA into law
on September 2, 1974. The Act completely revised the legal framework of the qualified
pension plan as it previously existed. The most significant innovations of ERISA concerned
participation, vesting, and funding standards. At the time ERISA became effective in 1975,
the number of private pension plans sponsored by private employers was 311,000; by 1990,
the number more than doubled to 712,000. In 1975, 103,000 defined benefit plans were in
existence, the number of defined benefit plans peaked in 1983 at 175,000, but then decreased
to 113,000 in 1990. In contrast, the total number of defined contribution plans increased from
208,000 to 599,000 between 1975 and 1989 and remained at 599,000 in 1990. CEM SILVER-
MANET AL, EmPLOYEE BENEFfT RESEARCH INST., EBRIDATABOOKONE PLOYEEBENEFIS
139 (1995).
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tain than defined benefit plans.'° This is especially true for 401(k) plans, in
which contributions typically are made only on behalf of individuals who elect
to contribute portions of their earnings to the plan."°a Also, employers seeking
to insulate themselves from fiduciary liability often adopt defined contribution
plans in which employees are required to make all investment decisions."°
These plans, known as participant-directed plans, representthe fastest growing
type of defined contribution plan inthe private retirement system."'
Defined contribution plans also have characteristics that are especially
appealing to employees. Defined contribution plans provide greater portabil-
ity because the accrued benefits in these plans are not reduced when partici-
pants terminate employment prior to retirement."' This characteristic allows
participants to roll-over benefits from their current plans either into new
employer plans or into individual retirement arrangements (IRAs) without
losing benefits when they change employment prior to reaching retirement
age." 2 Also, defined contribution plans more frequently provide pre-retire-
ment and lump sum distributions that give workers early access to their
retirement funds"
n3
107. See Soled & Wolk, supra note 104, at 591-93 (discussing advantages of defined
contribution plans); see also LANGBEIN & WOLF,, supra note 87, at 52 (describing benefits
attributed to 401(k) defined contribution plans); Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of
Defined Contribution Plans, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 607,614 (2000) (noting that in defined contribu-
tion plans, there is no need to pay PBGC premiums, and there are no fees for actuarial services).
108. Section 401(k) plans cost approximately one-third as much as traditional plans be-
cause contributions are made on behalf of only the employees who can afford to contribute to
the plan first. Karen Ferguson, PlansBenefit the Wealthy, USA TODAY, Nov. 25, 1997, at 13A.
109. In regular participant-directed plans, plan fiduciaries have a limited obligation to
make sure that plan participants are protected against losses owing to their investment decisions.
However, in section 404(c) "safe harbor" participant-directed plans, employers and other plan
fiduciaries are essentially shielded from all liability. For a more detailed discussion on fiduciary
liability in defined contribution plans, see Jefferson, supra note 107, at 627-28.
110. Marlene Givant Star, Paricipants in a Quandry about Plan Options, Pens. & Inv.
Rep. (BNA) 19,19 (1994).
111. The retirement benefit in a traditional defined benefit plan generally is based on a
final pay formula in which average compensation and service are used. Therefore, an increase
in any one year will increase the value of the benefit accruals for previous years. As a result,
in defined benefit plans, a substantial portion of the benefit can accrue in the final years of
employment. For this reason, the termination of employment prior to reaching normal retire-
ment in defined benefit plans can significantly reduce a participant's expected retirement benefit
in such plans. In contrast, the retirement benefits in defined contribution plans accrue much
more rapidly. Thus, these plans are especially appealing to younger, more mobile members of
the labor force. Regina T. Jefferson, Striking a Balance in the Cash Balance Plan Debate, 49
BUrF. L. REV. 513 (2001).
112. Id.
113. Qualified 401(k) plans generally do not permit distributions prior to an employee's
severance from employment, death, disability, or attainment of age 59.5. However, such plans
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Therefore, the reasons for the popularity of defined contribution plans in
the private sector suggest that they are more convenient for employers and
employees alike, not that they are the best way to maximize retirement income
security."4 Because defined contribution plans shift the risk of accumulating
inmsufficient assets for retirement from the employer to the employee, many
participants will not receive the retirement benefits that they expected and on
which they have relied. Consequently, notwithstanding their popularity, the
use of defined contribution plans as primary retirement savings vehicles has
serious implications both for the private pension system and for the retirement
income security of individual plan participants.
B. Risk of Shortfall in Defined Contribution Plans
1. Participant-Directed Plans
One reason defined contribution plans may fail to accumulate sufficient
amounts for retirement is inadequate investment information. The prevalence
of participant-directed plans that require employees to decide whether to
participate, how much to contribute, and how to invest their funds, makes it
more likely that some participants will experience shortfalls in their expected
retirement benefits.' In employer directed plans, a plan administrator or an
investment professional usually controls the plan investments. The invest-
ment professional is required to invest the assets in a manner that protects
participants against inflation, market fluctuations, and unfavorable market
conditions. 16 Investors should use the same investment strategy in partic-
ipant-directed accounts, but often do not because inexperienced investors have
insufficient training to achieve this objective.117
are permitted to make distributions on account of financial hardship. IC. § 401(kX2)(BXi)
(1994); Patricia E. Dilley, Hidden in Plain View: The Pension Shield Against Creditors, 74
IND. L.J. 355,412 (1999).
114. See Jefferson, supra note 94, at 107 (noting contemporary financial concerns of em-
ployers and changing work patterns of employees as primary reasons for popularity of defined
contribution plans).
115. See id. at 108 (discussing appeal of 40l(k) plans to employers).
116. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(bX2). Appropriate consideration is defined as the
"determination by the fiduciary that the particular investment or investment course of action is
reasonably designed, as part of the portfolio (or where applicable, that portion of plan portfolio
with respect to which the fiduciary has investment duties), to further the purposes of the plan,
taking into consideration the risk of loss and the opportunity for gain (or other return) associated
with the investment or investment course of action." Id.; Joseph R. Simone & Glen E. Butash,
Statutory Framework '_anguage" and Fiduciary Responsibility Provisions of ERISA, 385
PLI/TAX 7,24-27 (1996).
117. Diversiftcation IsKey to Success ofSection 401(k) Investments ASPA Told, 17 Pens.
& Inv. Rep. (BNA) 1243, 1243 (1990) (citing insufficient investment training as most fre-
quently referred to reason for overly conservative investment strategy).
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The modem portfolio theory of investment explains that an adequately
diversified portfolio should include an appropriate balance of stocks, bonds,
and stable-valued funds."' This is because a more balanced investment port-
folio provides an appropriate relationship between risk and return."' A high
concentration of stable-value, low-yield investments will generally produce
insufficient income over a participant's working life to provide financial secu-
rity at retirement.
20
As a rule, those who lack investment experience tend to disproportion-
ately select low-risk, low-yield investment instruments.' 2' An individual who
disproportionately invests in low-yield instruments would have to save signifi-
cantly greater amounts to be in the same position at retirement as a participant
who sufficiently diversified her investment portfolio." For this reason, the
use of an overly conservative investment strategy can be as dangerous as the
use of an overly aggressive one."
Inexperienced investors are not only less likely to adequately diversify
their portfolios, but they are also less likely to recognize the financial indica-
tors on which trained professionals rely when deciding to transfer funds from
one investment to another. 24 Therefore, the untrained investor may fail to
make changes when they are warranted, or in other situations may react too
quickly." For instance, in sudden market down-tums, these individuals may
sell high-risk, high-return investments too hastily, although professional
investors generally believe that such investments perform best over the long-
118. See J. Michael McGowan, Watching Your Basket Keys to Nurturing a Successful
InvestmentPortfolio, 78 A.B.A.J. 97 (Nov. 1992) (discussing "investment grade ratings" applied
to stocks, bonds, and mutual funds).
119. Id.
120. Inflation and the increase in life expectancy present further problems for conservative
investment strategies. Inflation, which has averaged 4% over the past decade, diminishes the
purchasing power of retirement income, and increases in life expectancies force plan partici-
pants to stretch the value of their assets even farther. Alexander Sussman, TheInvestmentHori-
zon: How Can EmployersAssureAdequate Retiree Benefits in the Coming Years?, 28 COM-
PENSATION&BEN. REv. 73,73 (1996).
121. See id. (discussing investment practices).
122. Regina. T. Jefferson, The American Dream Savings Account: Is It a Dream or a
Nightmare?, in TAXMNGAMERICA 261 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996).
123. Younger participants are especially vulnerable when they use overly conservative in-
vestment strategies because the compounding of their returns occurs over a much longer period
of time. Conversely, older participants are more vulnerable when they use overly aggressive
strategies, because there is insufficient time to recover from sudden downturns. See Moore,
supra note 9, at 354.
124. John R Keville, Note, Retire at Your Own Risk ERISA 'sReturn on Investment?, 68
ST. JoHN's L. REv. 527,545-46 (1994).
125. Id.
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run." Thus, the success or failure of participant-directed plans ultimately
depends on the individual participant's ability to allocate plan assets properly.
Notwithstanding the complexity of making prudent investment decisions,
ERISA imposes no additional education or notification requirements on em-
ployers who sponsor participant-directed plans. Only the general fiduciary
standards of ERISA govern these plans. 27 Accordingly, employers who spon-
sor participant-directed plans are not responsible for the investment decisions
made by plan participants as long as the plan provides a broad range of invest-
ment opti6ns.'2 Therefore, in participant-directed plans, the employer's
liability for poor investment performance as a plan fiduciary is reduced sub-
stantially. This reduction renders many of ERISA'a general fiduciary rules
irrelevant." For this reason, participant-directed plans raise serious questions
about the adequacy of ERISA's fiduciary rules."
126. Judy Greenwald, Investment Education Raises Employer Liability Questions: When
Does Information Become Advice?, Bus. INS., Oct. 31, 1994, at 2.
127. The general fiduciary standards were included under ERISA in response to concern
about "kickbacks, embezzlement, outrageous administrative costs, and excessive investments
in the securities of plan sponsors/employers." Elaine McClatchey Darroch, Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates: The Supreme Court's Dismantling of Civil Enforcement UnderERISA, 1994 DET.
C.L. REV. 1089, 1092; see also Joseph R. Simone & Glen E. Butash, Statutory Framework,
'Eanguage" and Fiduciary Responsibility Provisions of ERIJS, in UNDERSTANDING ERISA.
ANINTRODUCTIONTOBASICEmpLOYEERETREMENTBENEF'S 18 (1996) (explaining adoption
of provision was to protect interest of participants in employee benefit plans).
128. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04(c)-I(aXI) to 1(bX3) (2001). This section notes that a
plan offers a broad range of investment alternatives only ifthe available investment
alternatives are sufficient to provide the participant or beneficiary a reasonable
opportunity to: (A) materially affect the potential return on amounts in his
individual account with respect to which he is permitted to exercise control and the
degree of risk to which such amounts are subject; (B) choose from at least three
investment alternatives: (1) each of which is diversified; (2) each of which has
materially different risk and return characteristics... at any point within the range
normally appropriate for the participant or beneficiary, and (4) each of which when
combined with investments in the other alternatives tend to minimize through
diversification the overall risk of the participant's or beneficiary's portfolio.
Id.
129. See Simone & Butash, supra note 127, at 28 ("If a participant... exercises control
over the assets in his account, the fiduciaries ofthe plan will not be liable for any loss or for any
breach of fiduciary duty which is the result of the participant's exercise of control.") (citation
omitted).
130. See Jefferson, supra note 107, at 628. Section 404(c) safe harbor plans raise even
greater concerns regarding the adequacy of ERISA's fiduciary rules as they apply to participant
directed plans because these plans almost entirely insulate the employer from fiduciary liability
for the investment decisions made by plan participants. Id ERISA § 404(cXl) provides that
in the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts and permits
a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over assets in his account, if a
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Some employers voluntarily provide education for their employees to
enable them to make prudent investment decisions; however, many employers
choose not to provide these programs because they are costly."' Privatization
of the Social Security program will compound the effects of inadequate
financial training. Inexperienced investors will be required to make invest-
ment decisions regarding all three of the primary sources of retirement in-
come: private pensions, Social Security, and personal savings. 32
2. A Gap in Insurance Protection
Another reason defined contribution plan participants are more likely to
experience shortfalls in their retirement benefits is that the insurance program
for retirement plans has a gap in its coverage. The PBGC insures defined
benefit plans against losses owing to plan failure but does not insure defined
contribution plans.'33 Section 3(34) of ERISA provides that PBGC protection
is unavailable to plans in which the level of benefit for each employee fluctu-
ates depending upon the experience ofthe individual accounts.'34 Because the
contribution and investment performance of each separate account determines
retirement benefits in defined contribution plans, defined contribution plans
are excluded from coverage.'35 Although there is reluctance on the part of
policymakers to insure investment experience, as opposed to definite retire-
ment benefits, the effects of poor investment performance in defined contribu-
participant or beneficiary exercises control over the assets in his account (as
determined under regulations of the Secretary) (A) such participant or beneficiary
shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary by reason of such exercise, and (B) no person
who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable under this part for any loss, or by
reason of any breach, which results from such participant's or beneficiary's exer-
cise of control.
ERISA § 404(cXl), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(cXl) (1994); see also MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALTE
RETREmENT AND OTBEREMmOYEm BEN rPLANS § 16.3, at 787-88 (1996 student ed.) (dis-
cussing participant-directed individual account plans). Section 404(c) does not apply in situa-
tions where the plan fiduciary conceals material nonpublic facts, employs improper influence,
or follows the instructions of an employee who the employer knows to be legally incompetent
29 C.FR § 2550.404(c)-l(cX2Xi) to (iii) (2000).
131. See Moore, supra note 9, at 364-66 (explaining importance of education programs).
132. Derek C. Bok, Emerging Issues in SocialLegislation: Social Security, 80 HARv. L.
REV. 717, 741 (1967); see LANGBEIN & WOI, supra note 87, at 23 (noting that three most
important sources of income for Americans aged sixty-five and over in 1995 were Social Secu-
rity (43.7%), private and public pensions (18.6%), and income from personal savings (17.8%)).
Id.
133. ERISA §§ 4002-03 establishes PBGC. ERISA § 4022 governs payments of benefits.
134. ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1994); see supra note 102 and accompanying
text (describing PBGC insurance).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1994).
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tion plans and defined benefit plans are actually quite similar.1r" Thus, the
distinction between insuring defined contribution plans and insuring defined
benefit plans is based primarily on perception.137
The similarity of the impact of poor investment performance in defined
contribution and defined benefit plans can best be illustrated by considering
a defined benefit plan in which all of the actuarial assumptions used in the
funding process are correct over the life of the plan, except for the interest rate
assumption. 3 s If this plan terminates with insufficient assets, the potential for
benefit losses would be solely attributable to the unfavorable investment per-
formance of the plan assets. Therefore, to the extent that the PBGC guaran-
tees payment of the retirement benefits in such a plan, it effectively insures an
average investment return over the life of the plan."3 9 By comparison, there
is presently no protection against less-than-average investment performance
in defined contribution plans. In these plans, when shortfalls in the expected
retirement benefit occur because of unfavorable market conditions, the partici-
pant alone bears the loss. 40
The Executive Life crisis of 1988 is a real life example of the disparate
impact of market downturn on defined benefit and defined contribution plan
participants resulting from the gap in insurance protection. During the 1980s,
the Executive Life Insurance Company held a significant amount of pension
assets and was invested heavily in junk bonds.' 4 ' When the market crashed
in the late 1980s, Executive Life was unable to pay its contracts and ultimately
filed bankruptcy. Although all of the assets held by Executive Life had nega-
tive earnings, the company's collapse was more devastating for some plan par-
ticipants than for others. 142 Participants in defined benefit plans were insured
by the PBGC against losses, whereas those in defined contribution plans were
136. Under the pension insurance program, the PBGC provides substantial protection of
defined benefit plan benefits, but not of defined contribution plan benefits. Section 3(34) of
ERISA specifically provides that PBGC insurance does not cover individual account plans. 29
U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1994). Because the retirement benefit in defined contribution plans is
dependent on the contributions and earnings of each individual account, all defined contribution
plans are excluded from ERISA's insurance program. 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1994); Jefferson,
supra note 107, at 640.
137. Jefferson, supra note 107, at 680 (comparing defined contribution and defined benefit
plans).
138. There are other assumptions used for mortality, disability, turnover, salary scale
increases, and early retirement
139. See Jefferson, supra note 107, at 618.
140. See LANGBEIN & WOIY, supra note 87, at 53 (discussing drawbacks of defined-
contribution plans); Jefferson, supra note 94, at 109 (same).
141. Gary M FordDefined Contribution Plan GICLitigation, Annuities Legislation, and
PBGC Legislation, C996 A.L.I.-A3BA. 183, 187 (1995) (describing Executive Life collapse).
142. See id. (explaining that PBGC insurance only applies to defined benefit plans).
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not. Because the payments of the defined contribution plan benefits varied
with state insurance laws, some defined contribution plan participants received
as much as 70% of their retirement benefits, while others received nothing at
all.'43 The Executive Life crisis should serve as a reminder that as long as
there is no insurance protection for defined contribution plans in the private
pension system, there is a possibility that defined contribution plan partici-
pants may not receive their expected retirement benefits.1"
Insurance for defined contribution plans is a controversial subject be-
cause it is widely believed that insuring investment performance presents dif-
ficult measurement problems. However, designing a defined contribution plan
insurance program that provides insurance protection comparable in amount
and objective to that which exists for defined benefit plans is a feasible con-
cept.145 Thus, defined contribution plan insurance should be available to all
participants who rely on the use of individual account plans to provide their
retirement benefits. 46 Similarly, in the event the Social Security program is
privatized, there should be guaranteed minimum benefits or some other form
of protection available, to avoid significant benefit losses when sudden market
fluctuations occur, or when financial institutions become insolvent.
3. Early and Lump-Sum Distributions
Another reason participants may not receive the benefits they expect in
defined contribution plans is because of the availability of early, or lump
sum, distributions. 47 In-service distributions, or lump sumpayments attermi-
nation of employment, may encourage some individuals to spend portions of
their retirement savings for non-retirement purposes. 4 ' Although the law
permits the tax-free rollover of lump sum distributions received prior to
retirement into other qualified retirement plans, or into IRAs, most individu-
als who receive these distributions do not reinvest them in this manner.
149
The Congressional Research Service reports that only 33% of recipients who
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See Jefferson, supra note 107, at 651-66 (proposing Hypothetical Account Defined
Contribution Plan Insurance Program to ensure that defined contribution plan participants
receive minimum benefit at retirement); see also Jefferson, supra note 94, at 110 (noting that
defined contribution plan insurance is possible to develop).
146. See Jefferson, supra note 107, at 651-66.
147. See Jeffrey R. Brown, How Should We Insure Longevit Riskin Pensions and Social
Security, in CENTER FOR REIRMENT RES. AT BOSTON C. POL'Y BRIEF NO. 4 (Aug. 2000), at
6 ("Lump-sum withdrawal is the most common distribution option available.").
148. 111
149. EmLoYEEBEmEFrsREsEARHINsT.,FAcrSFRoMEBRI RoLLovERRATEs,avail-
able at http'i/www.ebri.orglfacts/0300factl3htm (last visited Oct 10, 2000).
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receive lump sum distributions reinvest them in retirement savings arrange-
ments.
50
Regardless of age, almost all employees choose lump sum payments
whenever they are available."' Some employers report that upon termination
of employment, employees often ask them to distribute their lump sum pay-
ments directlyto business establishments, such as auto repair shops.152 To the
extent that participants receive but fail to reinvest pre-retirement distributions,
they will have less money available to receive the tax benefits accorded funds
in qualified retirement plans.'53 This makes it less likely that these individuals
will accumulate sufficient amounts for their retirement income security.
Many employers express concern that they lose a key benefit when
employees spend their retirement savings on current consumption because the
employees are less likely to have retirement income sufficient to allow them
to retire at the appropriate time."' As a result, some companies do not allow
lump sum distributions from the defined contribution plans that they sponsor.
Nevertheless, lump sum distributions are the most common form of distribu-
tion in 401 (k) plans and in other defined contribution plans as well. 55
By contrast, the normal form of payment in both traditional defined bene-
fit plans and the existing social security program is annuities payable at retire-
ment.' 6 Life annuities provide protection against unexpected longevity and
are one of the most effective methods of ensuring that individuals do not out-
150. U.S. GEN.ACCOUNTNG OFFICE, CAsHBALANCEPLANs: MPLuCATioNsFoRRETiRE-
MENT INCOME, HEHS-00-207, Sept. 29,2000, at31 [hereinafter GAO RE ORT2000]. Younger
workers are less likely than older workers to reinvest their lump sum payments in other retire-
ment savings vehicles. Iat Only 27% of workers between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-
four reinvest their retirement funds in other retirement savings vehicles, as compared with 42%
of those between the ages of forty-five and fifty-four. Id. at 32. The Congressional Research
Report is based on its analysis of the Census Bureau's Survey on Income and Program Partici-
pation. Id. at 32 n.26.
151. See Elizabeth A. White, PBGC: Official Predicts PBGC Surplus Will Grow Again
for 1999 Fiscal Year, 26 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 2439,2439 (1999).
152. GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 150, at 31.
153. Qualified plans receive substantial tax advantages. The first advantage is that em-
ployer contributions are deductible by the employer when made, but are not taxed until they are
distributed to the employee. .LR.C. §§ 402(aX1), 404(aX1)-a(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The
second is that the income earned on the accumulated contributions is not taxable until distribu-
tion. Id. § 501(a).
154. White, supra note 151, at2439.
155. Only 27% of the 401(k) plans in existence in 1997 offered life annuity options. The
figures for other types of defined contribution plans are similarly low. Brown, supra note 147,
at 6.
156. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 87, at 580 (noting that most popular annuity is
50% joint and survivor annuity).
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live their assets. 1' Inadditionto solving the asset allocationproblem, life annu-
ities also prevent retirement assets from being used for current consumption.1'
In a defined contribution plan, it is difficult to determine with any degree
of certainty the level of savings necessary for retirement income security. The
failure to consider the effects of inflation or increasing life expectancies can
significantly overstate the value of one's expected retirement benefits." 9
Thus, the availability of lump sum distribution at termination of employment,
or in-service distributions prior to retirement, may encourage some individuals
to spend portions of their retirement savings for non-retirement purposes,
erroneously believing that the remaining amounts are sufficient for retire-
ment."e If Social Security were privatized without an annuitization require-
ment, and if workers were given access to their funds prior to retirement, the
same tension between current consumption and retirement savings would exist
in the Social Security system that now exists in the private system.
61
Therefore, the prevalence of 401(k) plans in the private pension system
is not ideal. Accordingly, the private sector's trend of using individual
account plans as primary retirement savings vehicles should not be replicated
in the Social Security program without addressing some of the weaknesses of
these plans, such as the absence of both minimum guaranteed benefits and
protection against longevity. Moreover, the Social Security program and the
private pension system are inherently different; consequently, many of the
characteristics of defined contribution plans that have made them popular in
the private sector are irrelevant to the Social Security program.
For example, unlike Social Security, the private pension system is volun-
tary and is comprised ofmany different employer-sponsored plans. This makes
responding to the preferences of employers and employees essential. 62 The
157. Brown, supra note 147, at 4. The value of a life annuity lies in its ability to solve a
retiree's wealth allocation problem. It is impossible to accurately predict when any retiree will
die; therefore, a life annuity solves the issues of retirees' conserving too much money before
death or consuming too much money before death, thereby depleting all retirement savings. Id.
158. See Jonathan Barry Forman, How Federal Pension Laws Influence IndiMdual Work
andRetirementDecisions, 54 TAX. LAW 143,150-51 (2000); see also Jefferson, supra note 111.
159. See Brown, supra note 147, at 5 (describing difficulty of predicting life span); see
also supra note 120 (describing effects of inflation and increased life expectancies on retirement
planning).
160. Jefferson, supra note 94, at 110. Even when workers spend their retirement savings
prematurely for essentials, such as the purchase of a house, education, or medical expenses,
their retirement security can be adversely impacted if there are insufficient amounts remaining
for retirement.
161. See Forman, supra note 158, at 181-83 (advocating mandatory pay out of pension
assets in form of annuity).
162. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (describing characteristics of defined
contribution plan).
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use of 401(k) plans in the private sector is not easily avoided, however,
because profit margins, market competition, and employee preferences must
factor into an employer's decision about what type of plan, if any, to offer.163
Furthermore, because the private retirement system is voluntary, it is appropri-
ate that cost sensitive employers be encouraged to establish these plans as less
expensive retirement savings alternatives rather than to forgo having any plans
at all. It is also appropriate to encourage employees to participate in these
plans with features such as more flexible distribution rules and greater invest-
ment discretion.'" In contrast, the Social Security system is a mandatory
program consisting of a single universal plan. 65 It is both unnecessary and
unwise for the Social Security program to appeal to the individual preferences
of employers and employees at the expense ofretirement income security.
IV The Impact ofPrivatization on Public Welfare
A. Goals and Objectives of the Program
In addition to risk-related issues, there are also public welfare issues that
should be considered in connection with Social Security reform. Social Secu-
rity was established as a social insurance program with two primary
objectives." First, the program is to provide a minimum standard of living to
the elderly, the disabled, and their dependent survivors."6 This objective
reflects a humanitarian view that covered workers and their dependents should
not live in abject poverty, and that society has a responsibility to provide them
at least a subsistence standard of living." The humanitarian aspect of the
program is based on the "social adequacy" principle and has been extremely
successful in eliminating poverty among the elderly population.1 69 The second
163. There are at least three diffeant types of participant-directed plans: the § 401(k) plan,
the § 457 plan, and the § 403(b) plans. CAN WE SAVE ENIOUGH TO RET 7E? PARTICIPANT
EDUCATIONINDEFINED CONTRIBUTIONPLANS 3 (EBR Issue BriefNo. 160,Apr. 1995).
164. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (discussing participant-directed plans).
165. See Dilley, supra note 14, at 1135-37 (describing expansion of coverage).
166. See Lewis D. Solomon & Geoffrey A. Barrow, Privatization of Social Security: A
Legal and PolicyAna4wis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9,14 (1995) (noting that two objectives
of Social Security are welfare and insurance).
167. SeeFrNAILREPORTOFThIE1937-1938ADVIsORYCOUNCLONSoALSECuRrrYI12-13,
reprintedinC.EU &SnhER &ONUBAKUA,RETOoUNGSCIALSEcUIIYFoRThE21ST
CENTURY 16 (1994) [hereinafter 1937-1938FINALREPORT]; Brown etal.,.upra note 39, at 636
(noting that "redistributive features [of social security] are grounded in considerations of 'social
adequacy,' which aims to provide adequate protection for all workers against loss of earnings due
to retirement or disability").
168. See JOSEPHA. PECHMANET AL., SOCIAL SECURrrY: PERSECTIVES FOR REFORM 55
(1968) (discussing purposes of Social Security).
169. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text (describing changes in poverty rate in
elderly population).
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objective of the program is to help moderate the decline in living standards
when the loss of wages occurs on account of retirement, disability, or death.
170
The income-replacement finction of Social Security operates independently
of need and is available to all covered workers regardless of income. This
function adheres to the principle of individual equity, requiring that there be
some relationship between benefits and contributions.17 As proposals to
restructure Social Security are contemplated, the impact of reform on both
functions must be considered seriously.
If the Social Security program is privatized in a manner that eliminates,
or significantly reduces, its ability to provide subsistence-level benefits for
covered workers, the program will have abandoned its public welfare function.
This will leave a tremendous void for many individuals who rely on Social
Security benefits for their retirement income .1 2 As many as one in seven
fbmilies rely entirely on their social security benefits for income, and as many
as 60% of retired households today depend on Social Security for more than
50% oftheir income.173 Without Social Security, one-half ofthe nations entire
population over age sixty-five would live in poverty.' Whether these individ-
uals would accumulate sufficient amounts for retirement in their individual
savings accounts would be determined by an element of chance."'
In the private sector, the retirement benefits earned under defined contri-
bution plans are similarly left to chance. Workers who are lucky, or who have
170. See PECBMANET AL., supra note 168, at 55 (noting objectives behind Social Security
program).
171. See 1937-1938 FiNALREPORT, supra note 167, at 17 (noting that ensuring fairretum
on contributions adheres to principle of individual equity, which means that workers should get
their money's worth).
172. The provision of minimum benefits in the Social Security program advances the anti-
poverty goal of the program. The public retirement system is uniquely able to deliver a mini-
mum level of benefit to all participants regardless of their level of contribution, not only because
of its humanitarian focus, but also because its benefits are backed by the government's power
to tax Consequently, the Social Security program is able to spread risk across a broader popu-
lation, including workers who have not entered the labor force. Burtless, supra note 71, at 4.
173. U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY RESTORING LONG.-TERM SOL-
VENCY WILLREQUME DIFFICULT CHOICES, T-HEHS-98-95, Feb. 10,1998, at 5. The minimum
Social Security benefit for a single worker is only 42% of the poverty threshold, and 50% for
married couples. Timothy M. Smeeding, Income Maintenance in Old Age: What Can Be
LearnedJrom the Cross-National Comparisons, 3d Annual Conference of Ret Research Con-
sortium, May 17-18, 2001, at 11 n.14; see Dilley, supra note 14, at 1120 (discussing reliance
on Social Security benefits).
174. Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under a Partially Privatized Social Securit Sys-
tem, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 969, 990 (1998) (noting success social security has had in assisting
elderly without developing same problems that exist in public welfare program).
175. See Senator Don, Nickles, Retiring in America: Why the United States Needs a New
Kind ofSocialSecurtyfor theNewMillennium, 36 HARV. J. ONLEGIS. 77,105 (1999) (describ-
ing stock market as risky).
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better than average investment skills, are rewarded withlarger retirement bene-
fits." 6 As a result, individuals who may have similar earnings and service
histories, but who are unlucky or unsophisticated in their investment skills,
ultimately may receive significantly smaller benefits."7 However, this result
is extremely inappropriate for Social Security. As a mandatory social insur-
ance program, Social Security should not be structured to reward the most
fortunate, or best-informed, members of society. This is particularly true
because high-income workers are more likely to have the financial skills to
maximize their investments orto have access to professional advisors that per-
form this service for them.1 ' Also, because it is advisable for individuals with
fewer assets to use more conservative investment strategies than those with
greater assets, low-income workers would not have the same opportunity to
achieve the higher rates of return as would high-income workers.
179
B. Redistrfibution
The Social Security payroll tax is assessed on one group of the popula-
tion while another group receives the benefits. 80 Therefore, to determine
accurately the distribution of the burdens and benefits of the Social Security
program by income class, it is necessary to consider separately the impact of
the payroll tax from that of the receipt of benefits. If this distinction is not
made, the aggregate of taxes and benefits by income class can be inaccurate
or misleading.
The payroll tax is levied against low and medium wages up to the earnings
cap, but it is not levied against higher wages in excess of the cap."' Conse-
quently, when considered relative to wages alone, the payroll tax is extremely
176. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text (discussing effects of investment
experience on potential returns).
177. See Hill, supra note 12, at 19 (noting that people who are unlucky or unwise risk
losing money); Moore, supra note 9, at 354-56 ("Common sense suggests that the relative lack
of investment experience of the at-risk groups [women, minorities, low-income workers] is
likely to result in their receiving lower rates of return under a partially privatized Social Security
system.").
178. U.S.GEN.AccoUlTNGOFFicE,401(K)PLANs: MANYTAKEADVANTAGEOFOPPOR-
TUNiTY TO ENSURE ADEQUATE RETIamENT INCOME 9 (1996) (noting that more educated and
higher-income workers are more aggressive investors and are more likely to invest in stocks
than are less educated and lower-income workers).
179. See Moore, supra note 9, at 354-60 & n.59 (finding that lower-income workers are
risk averse and would likely receive lower rates of return under privatization).
180. See Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under the CurrentSocial Security System, 61
U. Prrr. L. REV. 955, 960 (2000) (explaining that working generation distributes income to
retired generation).
181. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (describing payroll tax and earnings
cap).
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regressive."s However, Social Security replaces a greater proportion of low-
income workers' pre-retirement income than it does of high-income work-
ers'. 8 3 The average rate ofreturn on Social Security contributions for individ-
uals having lifetime earnings in the bottom 20% is between 4% and 5%. In
contrast the rate of return for those with earnings in the middle range is be-
tween 1% and 2%. Those in the highest earnings category receive a return of
less than 1%.184 Thus, the benefits paid by Social Security are highly progres-
sive. Most commentators believe that the progressive effect of the benefit
formula more than offsets the regressive effect of the payroll tax-s5
Therefore, the Social Security program is explicitly designed to redistrib-
ute income from high-income workers to low-income workers.8 6 Many
proponents of privatization, who would prefer awarding benefits solely on the
basis of contribution, have sharply criticized the redistributive characteristics
of the Social Security program." 7 However, it would appear that some level
of income redistribution is necessary and desirable for the Social Security
program to achieve both its anti-poverty and income replacement objectives.'
Redistribution benefits not only low-wage earners but also women.' 9
Redistribution on the basis of gender occurs primarily for three reasons. First,
182. Another reason the payroll tax has a regressive effect is because, unlike the federal
income tax, the Social Security tax does not differentiate on the basis of ability to pay. The
payroll tax is assessed against gross wages without adjustment for family size, major health
expenses, or casualty losses. Thus, the Social Security payroll tax is also regressive with respect
to the incomes or ability to pay of those who are subject to the tax. See PECHMAN ET AL, supra
note 168, at 178 (noting that payroll tax is proportionate to taxable limit and regressive there-
after).
183. Kevin Lansing, Rates of Return from Social Securit , FRBSF ECON. LETTER, Nov.
12, 1999, at 1.
184. See id. (noting returns for higher-income workers).
185. See Dilley, supra note 14, at 1123-26 (describing features of Social Security); Moore,
supra note 9, at 384-86 (stating that progressive benefit program tends to benefit at-risk groups).
186. See Lansing, supra note 183, at I (noting that low-paid workers are awarded higher
fraction of pre-retirement income).
187. See Joan T. Boket al.,RestoringSecurity to Our Social Securit Retirement Program,
in ADvisoRY CouNciL. REPORT, supra note 2, at 105 (arguing that benefits of privatization
would exceed those of Social Security); see also supra note 88 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing support of privatization).
188. Moore, supra note 180, at 954.
189. See id. (noting that progressive benefit formula of Social Security program benefits
women and minorities because both groups generally tend to be low-paid, and therefore, both
groups benefit from redistribution of income from higher-paid earners to lower-income work-
ers). Thus, a privatized Social Security program would disadvantage these groups because as
investors, they would have fewer resources to invest This would make it advisable for them
to select less aggressive investment instruments, also causing the yield on their accounts to be
smaller. Hill, supra note 12, at 19 (noting that low earners who are less able to take risks will
be less likely to attain average rates of return).
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women generally have lower earnings than men; as a result they benefit from
income redistribution." Second, women have longer life expectancies than
men, and they therefore collect benefits longer after retirement. 9" Third,
women are more likely to elect spousal benefits than men, which allows
women to collect amounts in excess of the benefits that they otherwise would
receive." The spousal benefits ofthe Social Security program entitle individ-
uals to receive the larger of either 100% of their own benefits or 50% oftheir
spouses' benefits once they reach age sixty-five, regardless of the amount of
their contribution." If the spouse dies, the widow or widower is entitled to
receive 100% of the larger benefit. A divorced spouse who does not remarry
is entitled to the same spousal benefit provided that the marriage lasted for at
least ten years. 94
Although numerous commentators have sharply criticized the spousal
benefit, this form of redistribution is not unique to Social Security. 95 Since
1984, the government has required private pensions to make similar awards
to non-employee spouses that result in distribution of income from one spouse
to another. 96 As a means of providing equitable protection to individuals who
190. See Moore, supra note 180, at 957-58 (noting that women are among groups most
vulnerable to poverty).
191. An average sixty-five year old man in the year 2000 can expect to live an additional
16.4 years, while an average sixty-five year old woman can expect to live an additional 19.6
years. However, as many as 31% of women will live to age ninety or above, as compared to
only 18% of men. Brown, supra note 147, at 5.
192. In 1997, 13% of women beneficiaries claimed spousal benefits as compared to only
2% of men. Hill, supra note 12, at 19.
193. "Women who are survivors of qualified workers are entitled to survivor benefits at
age 60, and at an earlier age if they are caring for a child who is under the age of 16, or dis-
abled." CTR. FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, EARNINGS SHAIUNGS IN SOCIAL SECUarrY: A
MODELFOR REFORM 18 (Edith U. Fierst & Nancy Duff Campbell eds., 1998). Another feature
of the existing Social Security program that is particularly valuable to women is the life and
disability insurance, which provides benefits to spouses caring for children under the age of
sixteen, if the wage earner retires, becomes disabled, or dies. Id. This portion of the Social
Security program provides a significant benefit. The disability policy has an estimated value
of $230,000, and the life insurance policy has an estimated value of $354,000 for the typical
worker. Id. If privatization eliminates or reduces this benefit, women would be impacted
disproportionately because they provide the bulk of care-giving in our society. Hill, supra note
12, at 18,35.
194. STEuBRLE&BAKu.A,supra note 167, at212-13.
195. One of the primary reasons the spousal benefit has been criticized is because it
redistributes income from singles and two earner-couples to one-earner couples. See id. at 256
(criticizing practice of giving nonworking spouses of high-income workers greater benefits); see
also Moore, supra note 9, at 397 (describing inequities in treatment of dual-earner couples as
compared to single-earner couples).
196. Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA), Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat 1426 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.). Congress passed REA in an attempt to
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have been full or part-time homemakers, the Retirement Equity Act of 1984
(REA) significantly expanded the entitlements ofthe non-employee spouse."9
In the event of death, the legislation provides that the non-employee spouse
receive benefits in the form of a life annuity." In the event of divorce, REA
prescribes conditions for enforcing state-court decrees that divide pension
property under arrangements known as Qualified Domestic Relations Orders
(QDROs).199
Congress imposed survivorship rights retroactively under REA, and thus
transferred substantial assets from one group to another. In fact, commenta-
tors have described these rights as the largest wealth transfer in American
history."°0 Because women disproportionately represent the homemaker
population, REA transferred many assets from men to women. 2 °1 Arguably,
the same concerns that caused Congress to redistribute large amounts of
income from men to women in the private sector - to protect the non-partici-
rectify the apparent gender gap created by the private pension system. See Dana M. Muir, From
Yuppies to Guppies: Unfunded Mandates and Benefit Plan Regulation, 34 GA. L. REV. 195,
216-23 (1999) (describing provisions of REA).
197. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 87, at 577-78 (discussing entitlements REA
provides to non-employee spouses). Prior to the enactment of REA, the rights of the spouse of
a pension plan participant to share in the participant spouse's pension benefits were limited sub-
stantially. Id. A distinction that is present between the two spousal benefits is that in the
private system, there is an actuarial reduction made for the benefits of the non-participant
spouse, while in the Social Security system, there is not Also, in the private pension system,
there is a direct transfer from one spouse to the other, whereas, in the Social Security program,
there is not See supra note 192 and accompanying text (noting that greater numbers of women
claim benefits).
198. The non-employee spouse can waive the benefit See LANGBImN&WoI, supra note
87, at 580-94 (providing detailed discussion of types and amounts of survivor benefits, includ-
ing Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuities, Qualified Preretirement Survivor Annuities, and
Qualified Domestic Relations Orders).
199. Child support may be included in a QDRO. REA § 104 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d) et seq. (1994)) (identifying "alternate payee" as "any spouse, former spouse, child or
other dependent of a participant who is recognized by a domestic relations order as having a
right to receive all, or a portion of, the benefits payable under a plan with respect to such par-
ticipant").
200. See LANGBEIN &WOuI, supra note 87, at 577-78 (noting this description).
201. In introducing the bill, Congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro stated:
Women are shortchanged by private pension plans because the system does not
truly recognize the contributions that women make to the economy or take into
account women's unique work patterns, patterns which revolve around childbearing
and other family responsibilities. [The homemaker] is dependent on her husband
and his earnings and at the mercy of death or divorce.
LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 87, at 578 (quoting Pension Equit for Women, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Labor ManagementRelations of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1983) (statement ofRep. Ferraro)).
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pant spouse - justify maintaining some support for the non-working spouse
in the Social Security systeM
202
Notwithstanding the redistribution of income from men to women in the
Social Security program and the private pension system, there is still a sub-
stantial gender gap in aggregate retirement income.2 3 The largest differential
is found in accumulated pension wealth and personal savings. 2°4 This dispar-
ity suggests that Social Security in its current form is an especially important
source of income for women because they generally enter retirement with
fewer economic resources. 5 In 1998, older women had a poverty rate of
13%; older men had a poverty rate of 7%.21 Twenty-five percent of all
women over age sixty-five who live alone depend on Social Security as their
only source of income.2 7 Thus, the redistribution of income from men to
women under the existing Social Security program only partially offsets the
gender gap in retirement income security in this country.
21s
C. Weaknesses in Privatization Proposals
Proposals to privatize Social Security not only raise risk-related and
public welfare concerns, but also practical ones. Proponents of privatization
proposals rely on the theory that the average rate of return on Social Security
contributions in the capital market would significantly exceed the risk-free
rate currently paid on Social Security funds.2 '7 However, because proponents
have not adequately considered certain assumptions and costs, it is doubtful
202. Some commentators have expressed additional concern that the current Social
Security spousal program provides larger benefits to the non-working spouses of high-income
workers than to the non-working spouses of low-income workers and that this result can not be
justified. STEUERI. & BAKIA, supra note 167, at 256. Thus, even if the spousal benefit were
retained, measures should be taken to ensure that non-working spouses at all income levels are
treated more consistently, such as by instituting a flat-rate benefit. Id.
203. Retirement assets traditionally consists of Social Security benefits, personal savings,
private pension benefits, and post retirement employment Hill, supra note 12, at 19.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 35; see also Moore, supra note 9, at 19 (finding that many women rely heavily
on Social Security benefits to avoid poverty).
206. HIll, supra note 12, at 19.
207. Id. at 17. Minority women are especially at risk for poverty during retirement Id. at
19.
208. HIll, supra note 12, at 19 (noting that spousal benefit is imperfect acknowledgement
of unpaid caregiving by women).
209. See Howell E. Jackson, Comment to Theodore J Angelis, Investing Public Money in
Private Markets: WhatAre the Right Questions?, in FRAMNG THE SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE,
supra note 94, at 336 (noting assumption that privatization plans would beat returns on current
Social Security contributions); see also supra Part ILB (discussing rates of return on Social
Security contributions).
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that privatization will raise the overall rate of return on payroll tax contribu-
tions to the extent that proponents of privatization anticipate.
The actual increase in the average rate of return on Social Security
contributions is unlikely to be as high as expected because the projected rates
of return used by proponents are unrealistic. Some proposals use the 9.4%
estimated return for the private market as a bench mark for the rate of return
that participants could expect to receive in a privatized Social Security sys-
teM.210 This expected rate of return is much too high. If workers were given
discretion in the investment of their accounts, they would be ill-advised to
invest all of their contributions in the stock market. Instead, workers should
be encouraged to allocate some of their investments to stable-value funds to
properly diversify their portfolios.21' This allocation would reduce their aver-
age expected rate of return.12 Also, the expected rate of return is unrealisti-
cally high because it assumes the stock market will perform as well in fiture
decades as it has over the last one. However, many economists predict that
the stock market reached its peak in 2000 and have advised individuals to
invest accordingly.
213
Another reason privatization may not provide the increase that propo-
nents expect is because the transition from a pay-as-you-go, public defined
benefit plan system to a pre-funded, individual account system would be very
expensive.21 Because the existing Social Security program is funded on a
pay-as-you go basis, there are presently large liabilities for the cost of benefits
paid to the earlier generations of retirees. 5 These liabilities will not disap-
pear with privatization. Therefore, even if the U.S. government adopted a
privatized approach to Social Security, current and future workers would still
have to pay the existing debts in order to honor the benefits promised to
previous generations." 6 The government could raise additional money either
by increasing payroll taxes or by reducing benefits; however, either of these
210. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (stating private market average rate of
return from 1926-1996).
211. See supra Part 11B (discussing rate of return on Social Security contributions).
212. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (discussing impact of diversification
on rates of return).
213. Jonathan Clements,Avoid Those Pesky MentalMistakes, WAIL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2001,
at C1. Most commentators agree that the stock market reached its peak in March 2000. Id.; see
also Mark Maremont & John Hechinger, If On You 'd Sold Some Stock Earlier, WAIL ST. J.,
Mar. 22, 2001, at Al (noting that NASDAQ exchange reached its peak on March 10, 2000).
214. See supra Part RA (discussing methods of Social Security funding).
215. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (describing inequities of pay-as-you-go
funding arrangement).
216. See Hill, supra note 12, at 18 (stating that transaction costs are hidden flaw of
privatization); see also supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (detailing risks of individual
account plans).
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methods would decrease the effective rate of return on current worker's con-
tributions.
2 7
The third reasonthat privatization is unlikely to achieve the projected rate
of return on Social Security contributions is that it understates additional
administrative costs. Social Security is currently a single, centralized system
in which the average administrative cost is relatively small, estimated at ap-
proximately $16 per individual per year.213 However, the conversion from a
single plan to a program containing 150 million individual accounts would sig-
nificantly increase this cost.219 Even a small increase could result in significant
losses over a worker's lifetime. For example, an increase of as little as 1% per
year in administrative costs would deplete an individual account by approxi-
mately 20% over a forty-year period.20
One possible effect of increased administrative costs would be a lowering
of the average investment return of all individual accounts in the program by
the same percentage. However, higher administrative costs also could cause
variations in return relative to a worker's wealth and investment experience."1
In the financial industry market, it is customary for service providers to reduce
fees to attract wealthier clients to whom other products can be marketed.'
Consequently, wealthier workers may receive more favorable rates than other
workers. Additionally, the cost of managing smaller accounts more likely
would be higher as a percentage of assets than the costs of managing larger
accounts. " 4 As a result, low-income workers actually could pay more in
217. See CADETTE, supra note 46, at 3 (noting that if benefits and tax rates remain
unchanged, reserves will be exhausted in thirty years).
218. Hill, supra note 12, at 19; cf Robert GenetskiAdministration Costs and the Relative
Efficiency of Public and Private Social Security Systems, CATO PRoJEc ON Soc. SEc.
PRiVATmATION, Mar. 9, 1999, at 3 (stating overall administrative costs of Social Security
program).
219. Experts have estimated that average administrative costs would increase between $25
and $50 per worker, per year if Social Security were privatized. Hill, supra note 12, at 19; see
also Genetski, supra note 218, at 3 (comparing cost of maintaining individual accounts with
administrative costs of operating private retirement accounts that would average between $30
and $50 to maintain).
220. See Hill, supra note 12, at 19.
221. See Jackson, supra note 209, at 337 (noting that administrative costs accrue due to
direct fees paid to account managers, as well as indirect costs, such as commissions from bro-
kerage accounts).
222. Id.
223. Also, individuals with prior investment experience will presumably have more infor-
mation enabling them to shop for lower fees. See id at 337 (noting that sophisticated partici-
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administrative costs than high-income workers under a privatized Social Secu-
rity program.
Finally, the fourth reason the projected increase in the rate of return for
a privatized system is unrealistically high is because it fails to account for the
full range of benefits and protection provided by the existing Social Security
program.' Proponents of privatization often compare the average rate of
return in the Social Security program to that of the private pension system or
to the private investment market.' However, these comparisons treat Social
Security as if it were exclusively a retirement program.' This is misleading
and distorts the results of such comparisons. The existing Social Security
program provides disability and life insurance in addition to retirement bene-
fits.' The fair market value of these benefits is substantial, with estimated
values of $230,000 and $354,000, respectively.2 -9 Accordingly, many of the
benefits awarded by Social Security are not retirement payments.' 0 Thus, it
is inappropriate to view the program exclusively as a retirement savings plan.
Doing so significantly understates the effective rate of return on Social
Security contributions under the current system.'1
It could be very costly for workers who desired disability and life insur-
ance to purchase, intheir individual capacities, this protection from the private
sector. Insurance companies are able to give more favorable rates to compa-
nies and other large groups because the risk of the insured event occurring is
spread over a larger population.m1 2 For example, with respect to disability
protection, the premiums paid by healthy individuals in a group who continue
working subsidize the cost ofthe unhealthy members ofthe group who become
too disabled to work. 3 Because risk spreading in this manner is not possible
with individual polices, the cost for such policies could be prohibitively
225. See STEUERLE & BAKUA, supra note 167, at 212 (explaining benefits under program).
226. See Thomas F. Siems, Reengineering Social Security in the New Economy, CATO
PROJECT ON Soc. SEc. PRrvATIZATION, Jan. 23,2001, at 10-12 (suggesting that market-based
portfolios generally outperform returns from Social Security contributions by wide margin).
227. See ill, supra note 12, at 18.
228. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (reporting value ofthese benefits).
229. See id (noting that Social Security taxes fund disability and life insurance as well as
retirement benefits).
230. See id. (suggesting that privatizers only compare return from Social Security to return
from private savings, ignoring disability and life insurance benefits).
231. Id.
232. See Linda J. Blumberg & Len M. Nichols, Health Insurance MarketReforms: What
They Can and Cannot Do, at http'/www.urban.orgfpub/hinsmre/msure.htm (last visited June
1, 2001) (stating that "[t]he principle behind insurance is to spread individual risks across a
group").
233. Id.
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expensive. Thus, the added expense for additional insurance protection could
significantly lower the net rate of return on Social Security contributions.
Furthermore, for individuals withpre-existing conditions, private disability and
life insurance may be unavailable at any cost.'
Conclusion
Although Congress needs to make changes in the current Social Security
system, the government should not abandon the primary goals and objectives
ofthe program. As a social insuranceprogram, Social Security is intended to
provide all insured workers with a safety net that protects them against loss
of wages due to retirement, disability, or death.
While privatization may generate greater returns for some individuals
relative to the returns that they could expect to receive under the existing pro-
gram, the privatization of Social Security is problematic in numerous respects.
Unlike the fixed benefits in the existing social security program, the benefits
from a privatized system are highly variable. Individuals who are unlucky or
who choose unwise investment strategies could lose benefits under such a
model. The replacement of the defined benefit plan model with individual
accounts would transform Social Security from a social insurance program to
a savings program. This change would expose all workers to significantly
greater risks. It also would fail to ensure a minimum standard of living for low-
income workers. Even those who have prior experience with the financial
market may not receive a greater return ontheir contributions ifthe market does
not perform favorably or if there are little or no restrictions placed on the
timing, use, and form of payment from the privatized accounts. For these
reasons, steps towards privatizing Social Security should be taken very cau-
tiously, and efforts should be made to ensure that all covered workers continue
to receive adequate benefits under the program.
234. See il, supra note 12, at 19.
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